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Elias Suvanto


PhD Student, Major Cryptography

University of Luxembourg

elias (at) suvan.to

elias.suvanto (at) uni.lu


About Me



Hi, I am Elias Suvanto, a Ph.D. student at University of Luxembourg, where I am conducting research in Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) under the supervision of Professor Jean-Sébastien Coron. I graduated from ENS de Lyon, France and obtained a Master of Computer Science, majoring in Cryptography.


For the past 3 years I worked at CryptoLab Inc., my research focused on the security, numerical stability and efficiency of FHE, with particular emphasis on the CKKS scheme and its applications in secure computation.


I am now quite interested in the use of approximate FHE on discrete data. Please reach out to me if you have any questions!


Experience

 


Cryptography researcher in Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Doctoral study at University of Luxembourg

CryptoLab Inc., Seoul and Lyon

November 2022 - present

 

Master of Computer Science

ENS de Lyon

September 2019-2023

Publications

Leveraging Discrete CKKS to Bootstrap in High Precision

Hyeonmin Choe, Jaehyung Kim, Damien Stehlé, Elias Suvanto

A new high precision bootstrapping whose cost grows logarithmically in the desired precision instead of linearly as in Meta-BTS.

Bootstrapping Small Integers With CKKS

Youngjin Bae, Jaehyung Kim, Damien Stehlé, Elias Suvanto

This paper introduces SI-BTS, a CKKS bootstrapping algorithm tailored to integer datatype. It improves throughput and allows to apply a LUT for free. It also allows efficient batch-bits bootstrapping.


Attacks Against the IND-CPA^D Security of Exact FHE Schemes

Jung Hee Cheon, Hyeongmin Choe, Alain Passelègue, Damien Stehlé, Elias Suvanto

Key-recovery attacks on exact FHE schemes, challenging the assumption that IND-CPA and IND-CPA^D security notions are equivalent for BFV/BGV/TFHE/discrete CKKS in practical implementations.


Key Recovery Attacks on Approximate Homomorphic Encryption with Non-Worst-Case Noise Flooding Countermeasures

Qian Guo, Denis Nabokov, Elias Suvanto, Thomas Johansson

This work demonstrates that certain countermeasures in approximate homomorphic encryption schemes like CKKS may still be vulnerable to key-recovery attacks.

Awards

Korean National Cryptography contest, National Security Research Institute and National intelligence Service: Grand Prize

Talks

I gave presentations at CCS 2024 on Attacks against the IND-CPAD security of Exact FHE Schemes and at Asiacrypt 2024 on Bootstrapping Small Integers with CKKS.

Reviews & Sub-reviews

  • Artifact Evaluation Commitee member of USENIX Security 2025
  • Subreviewed for Eurocrypt 2025, Asiacrypt 2024